The charismatic power of a great thinker raises to a heightened pitch the normal level of irrationality produced by paradigm conflict. In defense against such a powerful intellectual center, there emerges alongside the usual thrusts of serious theoretical combat an antagonistic tradition of misinformed, often trivial, sometimes grossly distorted commentary that attempts to present itself, and is partly accepted as, critical truth. At the same time, the attractive power of this center is such that those who follow the thinker prove unable to present an objective critical evaluation of his intellectual contributions. Only with the passage of time, as the center loses its immediate power, can a perspective which is both critical and appreciative be attained and the thinker's permanent contributions to intellectual tradition be properly assessed.
We can observe this tortuous path of assimilation in the reception of Marx's work and Weber's, but the process seems particularly striking, and particularly apropos of the subject of this essay, in the case of Durkheim. As a forceful figure both intellectually and personally, Durkheim created a powerful sociological school which followed Durkheimian theory in a manner which greatly extended its scope and application but did little to articulate its foundations or to clarify its critical weaknesses (Clark, 1973) . At the same time, Durkheim's theory was subject to a barrage of what was often distorted and tendentious criticism, directed not only towards his theoretical conceptions but in addition towards his ideological involvement in the reconstruction of the French republic (Lukes, 1972) . Only in the late 1930s and the 1940s, with the work of sociologists like Parsons and Merton and anthropologists like Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard-and, indeed, after the decline of almost all literalistic Durkheimianism-was the attempt begun to reappropriate Durkheim's theoretical work. And only in the last decade has the debate about his ideological perspective been sufficiently separated from the rigid radical/conservative dichotomy to enable the true humanitarian and progressive impetus of his work to be understood (Lukes, 1972: Chaps. 17, 26; Giddens, 1971: Chap. 7; Marks, 1974; Bellah, 1973) .
A remarkably similar process of assimilation and its vicissitudes appears to be the fate of Talcott Parsons's work. After an initial period of the inflation of his intellectual prestige and the creation-of a large number of distinguished followers, there emerged a second period during which it suffered an intensification of the same kind of distorted critical appraisal on both the theoretical and ideological levels. There have been recent indications that a more balanced sort of critical assessment is in the process of emerging, as thinkers of different theoretical and political traditions have returned to Parsons's work and argued for the centrality and significance of its central concerns (Atkinson, 1972: 1-143; Jessop, 1972; Gintis, 1969; Rocher, 1975; Bershady, 1973; Turner, 1974: 15-76, 193-210; Turner and Beeghley, 1974; Lipset, 1975; Johnson, 1976; Menzies, 1977; Alexander, 1979) . It is as a contribution to this theoretical and ideological reassessment that this essay is intended.
MISINTERPRETATION AND THE VOLUNTARISM PROBLEM
The sociological conventional wisdom has pegged Parsons as a functionalist, an equilibrium or consensus theorist, an ideologist. Such characterizations have been promoted not only by his critics but often by his supporters as well (Lockwood, 1956; Coser, 1956; Dahrendorf, 1958; 1959; Mills, 1959; Martindale, 1960; Gouldner, 1967; Rex, 1961; Foss, 1963; Friedrichs, 1970; Wallace, 1969; Bottomore, 1974; Levy, 1952; Smelser, 1959; Mayhew, 1968b; Rocher, 1975; Johnson, 1973; Lipset, 1975; Baum, 1976; Loubser, 1976; Van Zule Slabbert, 1976) . None of these descriptions, however, is sufficiently generalized to comprehend Parsons's most fundamental theoretical contribution. This lies, I would argue, more in the realm of what might be called sociological epistemology, in the formulation of a distinctive epistemological position and in its translation into the realm of sociological explanation. I To fully illuminate this realm of Par-' For example, while there is no doubt that Parsons's work would involve exploring a wide range of diverse issues. In the present context I will limit my focus to only one aspect of the problem; namely, to the issues of voluntarism in Parsons's thought.2 After elaborating, in a condensed manner, the nature of Parsons's theoretic-epistemic position on this issue, I will demonstrate its relevance for practical sociological work by indicating how Parsons combines his commitments in this realm with the ideological and empirical positions which govern his theory of social change. I will call the position Parsons has articulated on the theoretic-epistemic level his "formal voluntarism" and its empirical-ideological articulation, his commitment to the standard of "substantive voluntarism."
In social theory, the issue of voluntarism revolves, on the most general level, around two long-standing debates, the arguments over nominalism vs. realism, and subjectivism vs. objectivism (Aristo- sons's functional commitment has had an important impact on his theoretical system, the influence has been on the level of model rather than on the level of epistemic presuppositions-a level which, because of its greater generality, is theoretically more significant. Furthermore, even as a model, the functional system provides wide limits of flexibility which can in no sense be associated with propositions about empirical equilibrium or conflict, or with notions about idealism-materialism, individualism-sociologism, conservatism-radicalism-as has so often been assumed (Sztompka, 1968; Stinchcombe, 1968: Chap. 3; Smelser, 1972; Hobsbawm, 1973; Lipset, 1975) . This literature indicates that the notion of system is an open one, which assumes a particular content only in relation to specific theoreticepistemic, ideological, and empirical commitments. Little significant understanding of the varied course of Parsons's intellectual development can be derived from studying his theory's functionalist aspects, whereas a great deal of that variation can be illuminated by focusing on its theoretic-epistemic assumptions.
2 Though voluntarism plays a crucial role in Parsons's work, it should not be considered the master key that unlocks his entire theory. For a fuller discussion of the different levels involved in his analysis-and a methodological justification for the distinction between the theoretic-epistemical, ideological, and empirical level of sociological discourse which I assume here-see Alexander (1979: Vol. 2, Pt. 3; and Vol. 1, Chap. 2).
1968; Martindale, 1960; Hughes, 1958; Habermas, 1973a; Wilson, 1970) . Parsons's position on these questions has been as radically misinterpreted as his position on the less generalized issues of system models, consensus theory, and ideological commitments. Basically two kinds of charges have been made. According to one strand of the critical literature, oriented to the nominalist-realist debate, Parsons is decidedly an antivoluntarist. These critics portray Parsons's writings, particularly his later ones, as concerned only with the organic whole, as taking an antiindividualist, determinist position (Scott, 1963; Martindale, 1960; Friedrichs, 1970; Atkinson, 1972; Pope, 1973; Menzies, 1977) . The other critical strand, oriented to the subjective-objective question, takes a rather contradictory position. According to these critics, Parsons is an idealist who envisions no significant constraints on individual action (Lockwood, 1956; Dahrendorf, 1959; Gouldner, 1970; Heydebrand, 1972) . For critics of the first persuasion, Parsons's stand on the subjective-objective issue is irrelevant; what matters is simply that he postulates supraindividual constraint per se (Atkinson, 1972: 1-145). For critics of the second persuasion, however, it is Parsons's position on the nominal-realist, or individual-society, question which is unimportant. For them, Parsons's emphasis on norms in itself commits him to an unacceptable degree of voluntarism. On one matter, however, both of these critiques are in agreement: Parsons's failings, whatever they may be, are vitally connected to his ideological conservatism.
The great contradiction between these two critical positions should alert us to their problematic status. In the following, I will demonstrate that both of these critiques are mistaken, not only in their characterization of Parsons's theoreticepistemic position, but in their ideological critique as well.
What neither group of critics has seen, apparently, is the synthetic nature of Parsons's theoretical intention, the manner in which a major segment of his work has been directed, from the beginning, toward bridging these fundamental theoretical dilemmas (see Devereux, 1961) . Western thought can be regarded as involving two great traditions (Ekeh, 1974) : the individualist (nominalist) and collectivist (realist), each of which in turn includes both romantic (subjectivist) and rationalist (objectivist) strands. To correctly comprehend one major thrust of Parsons's intellectual project, and certainly to penetrate his most important contributions, his writing must be viewed as a vigorous dialogue with each of these traditions. We will see that in his formal, theoreticepistemic work, Parsons sought to articulate a structure for social action that ascribed voluntarism to the influence of subjective ideal elements, which are internalized by the individual and which allow him or her autonomy vis-h-vis material constraints. In this manner, Parsons rejects the nominalist notion that freedom involves the complete lack of constraint. On the other hand, in his application of this position to concrete empirical situations, Parsons has utilized this structure to articulate a model of historical development keyed to the standard of individual control over both material and ideal constraints. Parsons's relation to these two critical traditions, in other words, attempts to achieve a dialectical kind of negation, an aufhebung which preserves kernels of theoretical truth while it transcends the theoretical position as a whole.
FORMAL VOLUNTARISM: THE THEORETIC-EPISTEMIC SYNTHESIS

The Individualist Tradition
The most important source for Parsons's explicit emphasis on voluntarism is the individualist strands of Enlightenment thought. These are the traditions which stand at the heart of nineteenth century liberal ideology and emphasize free will as the principal ethical criterion of freedom. In its social scientific form, this ideological point is transposed into a distinctively individualistic theoretical position, which perceives social action as initiated by, and society as resting upon, discrete individuals who are free to pursue their interest as they have defined it. Historically, in terms of nineteenth century thought, this indi-vidualist social science was articulated by neo-Kantian and Utiltarian theory (Martindale, 1960:216-66; Halevy, 1901 Halevy, -1904 . In contemporary terms, the individualist tradition manifests itself in the sociological schools of symbolic interactionism, exchange theory, and phenomenological and existentialist sociology, all of which consider the freedom of the individual person as the starting point for theoretical analysis.
Parsons's response to this tradition argues that its voluntarism is based upon a radical misunderstanding of the theoretical role of the concept "individual," a problem which he attributes to a metamethodological problem; namely, the empiricist confusion of concrete and analytic frames of reference (Parsons, 1937: 72-4, 87-125; see also Whitehead, 1925; Schwanenberg, 1971; Fararo, 1976; Burgher, 1977; Parsons, 1970a Action may be described, in other words, as both instrumental and normative. In terms of the subjective-objective debate, action's voluntarist quality is preserved by the latter, its determinist quality by the former. In terms of the nominalist-realist debate, action is both individual and social. Individual action is ordered by the patterning of normative symbols and by the organization of material constraints. Yet, since normative patterns are internalized, a significant cause of any action rests with the willed behavior of the concrete individual.
In order to understand fully this attempt at theoretical synthesis, it is vital to assess its peculiar status in Parsons's work. By transforming the distinctive elements of individualist, idealist, and materialist theory into a broader whole, Parsons's intention has been to delineate the structure of action and society apart from any of its particular manifestations, in the same manner that Chomsky has focussed on generative grammar as the universal structure of language (Chomsky, 1968; Bershady, 1973). In Parsons's (1937:733) own terms, the elements of action he has articulated have phenomenological status, in Husserl's sense. According to this analytic perspective, voluntarism is a formal property of action; it does not depend on the particular historical nature of the ideal and material conditions which constrain it.
A major part of Parsons's intellectual effort has been devoted to developing this understanding of the formal structure of multidimensional causality and value internalization into a fully elaborated theory of social life. We have dealt here mainly with his first and classic formulation in 
SUBSTANTIVE VOLUNTARISM: THE IDEOLOGICAL-EMPIRICAL SYNTHESIS
A theory of formal voluntarism is necessary but not sufficient for a theory of substantive voluntarism because such a substantive theory is linked not only to presuppositions about theoretic-epistemic strategy but also to explicit ideological standards and propositions about the empirical world. Parsons's approach to substantive voluntarism is embodied in his theory of social change as differentiation. This change theory has been widely misinterpreted. It has long been argued, of course, that Parsons does not have a theory of systemic change at all. Recently, however, in response to the voluminous scholarly writing on differentiation, the anti-Parsonian critique has evolved into an argument that the functionalist approach to change is, in fact, overly systemic (Smith, 1973) . On the other side of the debate, Parsons (1967; 1970b; 1971c:27) himself has tried to describe his approach to change as being completely nonideological, as basing its analysis of evolving social structures exclusively on the criteria of which structures bring greater adaptive capacity to the social system. Neither of these interpretations is valid. Once again, we must step outside the polarization between Parsons and his critics to gain the proper perspective.
We have seen that Parsons critically reformulates the theoretic-epistemic content of the rationalist, progressive strands of individualist and collectivist thought. By no means, however, does he simultaneously abandon their ideological commitments to the expansion of voluntarism. To the contrary, it might be argued that Parsons has reformulated these theories precisely to preserve the essential libertarian aspects of their ideological perspectives. In formulating his own ideological perspective, in other words, Parsons's relation to these traditions is very different than in his formulation of the theoreticepistemic problem.
If formal voluntarism refers to a universal property of all action abstracted from time and space, and from any specifically ideological properties, substantive voluntarism refers exactly to the opposite: to the degree that particular historical and social conditions allow the realization of individual freedom defined in terms of a particular ideological perspective. Therefore, although Parsons has discarded the individualistic position as a formal framework, his theory of differentiation accepts it as providing the basic parameters within which any theory of substantive freedom must be rooted (see Tiryakian, 1975:27-31 By grounding his theory of substantive voluntarism in the formal integration of these three positions, Parsons attempts to avoid such pitfalls. According to his theory of social change, personal au-tonomy is achieved to the degree that the institutions associated with the different dimensions of society, the functional subsystems of economics, politics, integration, and value maintenance, become differentiated from one another and, in the process, develop (1) their own independent criteria for performance as expressed in institutionally separated media; and (2) the capacity to mobilize the resources of other dimensions by asserting a partial but independent regulation over them. Although these developments-which Parsons calls the growth of institutionalized individualism-are viewed as occurring within the context of the social system as a whole, they can be seen as involving differentiation of three distinctive types: cultural, structural, and psychological (Parsons, 1966: 20-9; 1971b; 1971c: 18-28).
Cultural Differentiation
In terms of the formal theory of multidimensional causality, cultural, or value patterns constitute a dimension of every social structure and, at the same time, an independent dimension subject to an independent set of causal forces. In terms of Parsons's substantive theory of social change, it is necessary to consider the development of these patterns as an independent process of differentiation with a distinctive relationship to the achievement of substantive voluntarism. The achievement by the value dimension of society of transcendent regulative power vis-h-vis more conditionally-oriented social structures, Parsons believes, is directly related to the capacity of a society, or a particular society group within it, to engage in reform and directed social change (see Durkheim, 1893).
Parsons (1966; 1961; 1963) The most systematic and widely tested Parsonian framework for dealing with therelation between the development of substantive voluntarism and the emergence of autonomous cultural levels is the pattern variable scheme, especially the universalism-particularism dichotomy. In Parsons's perspective, the cultural pattern of universalism promotes critical judgment because it demands that all particular traits be evaluated according to a broader, more general set of principles. Universalism, in other words, is a form of differentiation: it creates distance between the cultural norms and the object of judgment. In a series of essays on Japan, Turkey, the nations of Western Europe, and the United States, Bellah (1970: 53-189; see also Geertz, 1971) has traced the effect of religious particularism and universalism on the possibility for achieving democratic political activism. Lipset's (1967) The First New Nation is the most important application of the pattern variable schema to the specific question of the impact of different kinds of Western political cultures on the possibility for structural reform. 
Structural Differentiation
Struggles by groups to maintain and usually to increase their scope of action also initiate differentiation in the structural sphere, which in Parsons's terms refers not to material conditions per se but rather to institutional organization in each of the four different dimensions of the social system. What is at stake in this aspect of differentiation is the long and painful growth of the autonomy of different institutional sectors, the evolution from an historical situation in which single institutions, groups, and leaders perform, and therefore monopolize, multifunctional tasks to a more diversified structural situation in which there is more of a single function focus. Differentiation. in any given dimensional sphere can be described as a never-ending process. It begins with the simple emergence of a new structure (for example, a centralized government bureaucracy) and only gradually achieves a certain level of substantive autonomy, as when a central government structure becomes constitutionally democratic or achieves the ability to command economic resources for public action. Each phase of structural differentiation is linked to greater self-expression, to increased voluntarism, for a particular group, and usually to an increase in the supply of resources-economic, political, integrative, or value-oriented-for the expansion and growth of groups in certain other sectors. At the same time, any given phase will usually also involve the suppression of rights and the restriction of voluntarism for certain other groups, and for this reason any instance of structural differentiation often triggers renewed struggle.
The differentiation of the economic market system, with its power to command resources from other sectors and its development of an independent form of media in money, represents a classic example of how structural differentiation can interweave autonomy, expansion of resource production, and the partial suppression of rights. Parsons ( (1958; 1966; 1972) , Easton (1953; , Deutsch (1963; , Mitchell (1958; , and Johnson (1966) . In her work, Keller (1963; see also Eisenstadt, 1971c) formulated the implications of differentiation theory for institutional stratification studies; she argued that the process replaces "ruling class" by "functional elite."
The other dimensions of structural differentiation and the types of substantive voluntarism which they entail have been accorded less attention to the degree they depart from the traditional concerns with economy, polity, and religion. In regard to the integrative dimension, with the exception of the phenomenon of citizenship to be discussed below, the focus has been limited to the problem of the differentiation of legal structures. In addition to the discussions by Parsons (1971c: Chap. 2) himself, the work of Little (1969) and Mayhew (1968a) traces a continuum from the first delineation of distinctive secular rights to the successive attempts at their real institutionalization. In terms of differentiation in the value dimensionexcluding religious patterns, which we have already analyzed as cultural developments-the emerging autonomy of families, peer groups, schools, and scientific institutions has been discussed, respectively, by Smelser (1959) , by Eisenstadt (1971a) and Parsons (1964: 155-82), by Parsons and Platt (1973) , by Dreeben (1968) and Ben-David (1971) . The manner in which these developments facilitate the growth of substantive voluntarism will be the subject of the analysis of psychological differentiation below.
Little theoretical or empirical work has been done on bringing these various analyses of structural differentiation together to develop a more integrated theory of multidimensional causality and a fuller notion of the ramifications of the growth of substantive voluntarism in a differentiating system. Perhaps the closest attempt to such a synthesis is Parsons's (1971c: Chaps. 2, 6; 1967: 490-520; Parsons and Platt, 1973: Chap. 4) analysis of the differentiation of the integrative dimension of the nation, the dimension he labels the "societal community." To the degree that the societal community is differentiated, the national community becomes defined universalistically; such universalism implies that in crucial instances an egalitarian national solidarity will supercede the more particularistic definitions of national community generated by class, race, ethnicity, region, or religion. Clearly, the emergence of such a societal community is a major prerequisite for the achievement of substantive voluntarism, for the ability to control and reform the production of different dimensional resources in an egalitarian way. As such, this differentiation is dependent on very distinctive kinds of developments in the economic, political, value and normative spheres. It can be viewed, in fact, as the result of the interminable struggle by social groups in each of these different spheres for continually more effective inclusion into the national society (see Eisenstadt, 1969: Smelser, 1959; integrates Freudian and Piagetian theories of individual development with his analyses of cultural and structural differentiation. The Resource Chart conceptualizes the sequential stages involved in the production of an individual from the earliest stage of childhood to achievement of the adult role. In terms of Parsons's later theory of subsystem interchange, this process can be described as the passage from full-time participation in the institutions of the value maintenance dimension to participation in the institutions of the more conditionally-oriented organizations of adult society. Since the effect of cultural and structural differentiation is to separate value maintenance institutions both from one another and from institutions in other dimensions of the social system, the impact of such differentiation of the Resource Chart can be visualized as increasing the number of developmental stages involved in the passage from childhood to adulthood. In terms of Freudian theory, the greater mobility required for this transition to adulthood can be accom-polished only by increased ego autonomy and control over affective dependency. Conversely, in terms of differentiation theory, this social demand for psychological voluntarism meshes with the psychological opportunities provided by certain structural developments: the growing separation between the increasingly functionally-specific nuclear family and the institutions that develop to fulfill other social functions facilitates rebellion, separation, and neutralization vis-a-vis basic object relationships.
This interweaving of the Freudian understanding of individual personality growth with the broader theory of substantive voluntarism as the product of cultural and structural differentiation has been developed most by Weinstein and Platt (1969) . In The Wish To Be Free, they contend that it was the development of structural differentiation-in Parsons's technical sense, the expansion of the Resource Chart-which eventually created in nineteenth century Western society the opportunity for successful Oedipal rebellion and separation from authority. In turn, they argue that this expansion of the developmental process and increase in psychological autonomy were themselves crucial and independent variables in the subsequent development of substantive voluntarism through the differentiation of other institutional spheres. At the same time, Weinstein and Platt (1969) emphasize that just as social and psychological differentiation are related in a positive manner, so can they be negatively interrelated. The lengthening of the passage from full-time participation in value maintenance institutions to more participation in conditional dimensions is not only a liberating but also a perilous development. By radically increasing the challenge of the transitional process, it also increases the likelihood for failures, for the pathological dedifferentiation that Weinstein and Platt (1969: Chap. 7) call the universal reactions to modernization. In his essay on youth culture, Parsons (1964: 155-82; see also Slater, 1961a; 1961b; Chodorow, 1974; 1978) has described one stage of this dedifferentiation as a basic structural problem of modern society.
This kind of historical analysis of the interplay between psychic and social differentiation has also been pursued by Bellah (1970:76-99 The successful contribution to this extended socialization process of the other newly differentiated structure, the adolescent peer group, has been analyzed by Eisenstadt (1971a; see also Fass, 1977) in From Generation to Generation; the more particularistic pathological aspects of peer group culture by Pitts (1964: Since societies, particularly modern and modernizing ones, are continually subject( to strains at all levels and at varying intensities, social change must be viewed as a constant and highly uneven process (Smelser, 1971: 7) . According to the Parsonian theory of change outlined above, societies have two options in response to such strain: either differentiation or dedifferentiation. Because it allows flexibility in the face of vested interests, both material and ideal, differentiation is linked to the capacity for system reform and to the extension of individual freedom. If a society is unable to engage in differentiation, the social response will be to suppress the reaction to strain rather than to eliminate its source. The possibility will be raised for the conflation of differentiated structures and the reduction, rather than expansion, of the possibilities for individual autonomy and control (Smelser, 1962; Eisenstadt, 1964c; Weinstein and Platt, 1969) . By creating an historical theory that describes a continuum of different kinds of reaction to strain and the conditions under which each might occur, Parsons has developed a perspective that, far from neglecting conflict, presents the framework for a comprehensive approach to its explanation and evaluation (see also Rueschmeyer, 1977) .4 4 In fact, Parsons's theory of social change can be seen as providing a more general framework for analyzing the very theoretical points advanced by the .three conflict theorists who have been some of his sharpest critics (see Atkinson, 1972) ; the ruling class situation described by Rex (1961) The problematic aspects of Parsons's theory are elements that reflect an ambivalence about the very theoretical and ideological tensions that Parsons has resolved so effectively in the strands of his work analyzed above. Because of this ambivalence, his work, considered as a whole, contains major contradictions on both formal and substantive levels.
On the formal level, the synthetic approach that Parsons so carefully develops is crosscut by a significant idealist strain. Simply in terms of his focus of attention, the internal dimensions of values and norms, both as institutional spheres and as cultural patterns, have received vastly more of his attention than the conditional dimensions of economics and politics. More importantly, when these latter dimensions do become the focus of Parsons's extended attention, they are described empirically in such a manner that they facilitate rather than conflict with the normative inputs to their production (see Gouldner, 1970:286-325) . Furthermore, the systemic conflict that Parsons does find throughout social life much more often occurs in the value or normative dimensions and in the tension between these dimensions and the more conditional ones, than within the economic and political spheres themselves. In addition to these problems, a strain of holism characteristic of an unreconstructed realism coexists alongside Parsons's focus on the independent role of the individual in action. For example, Parsons emphasizes conflict between internally integrated subsystems and between groups which share the same overarching value commitments rather than conflict between groups within the same subsystem which, to use Evans-Pritchard's (1953) term, "refract" common value patterns into partial and opposed commitments.
The same kinds of ambiguities of resolution represent significant strains in Parsons's ideologically related approach to social change. For example, in his description of cultural differentiation as generalization, there is a tension between a rather conservative emphasis on generalization as simply the provision of greater integration and the other emphasis, described above, on its promotion of increased critical activism and, indirectly, social conflict (Parsons, 1971b; Toby, 1975) A flexible society benefits from conflict because such behavior, by helping to create and modify norms, assures its continuance under changed conditions. Such mechanisms for readjustment of norms is hardly available to rigid systems: by suppressing conflict, the latter smother a useful warning signal, thereby maximizing the danger of catastrophic breakdown.
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. Despite the effective argument that can be made that democratic socialism represents an advance towards social differentiation and towards the achievement of substantive voluntarism, Parsons has always dismissed out of hand the developmental advantages to be gained from institutionalizing public ownership and redistributive public policies (see also Rocher, 1975: Similarly, Eisenstadt (1969) has written at great length, in the formal framework of multidimensionality, about the often insurmountable conditional problems presented by economic classes and by the centralization of political power. And Lipset's (1967; see also Pitts, 1964) utilization of the pattern variable scheme contains an extensive analysis of political conflict in terms of subgroups representing opposing value patterns. On the ideological side, the last decade has produced a distinctly leftward movement among some Parsonians, who are responsible for a series of essays which critique contemporary Western society from the general perspective established by differentiation theory (Pitts, 1974; Bellah, 1970: 193-257; Eisenstadt, 1973: 231-57; Gould, 1976; Smelser, 1975) . In working out the latter idea, Habermas's (1973a:315) intention is to construct a theory of human "evolution toward autonomy and responsibility" keyed to the ideal of increased "freedom from domination." In order to do so, he realizes that his theory must measure progress toward "human adulthood" on the psychological level, and he incorporates Freudian concepts to accomplish this (1970:119; 1973b:256) . Habermas acknowledges further that, in addition to including the structural emphasis of Marx, he must address the problem of the historical development of moral systems (1973b:2-3) and the preconditions of an autonomous public opinion, one with the capacity to mediate between a society and its social values (1970:72-4) . Despite the often brilliant texture of his argument, however, Habermas has failed throughout mous accomplishments of Parsons and the members of his sociological school, the theories of both formal and substantive voluntarism remain relatively undeveloped. Not only are vast theoretical, ideological, and empirical issues barely articulated, but Parsons's own contributions have been marred by contradictory strains. Parsons's fundamental contributions to social thought have only begun to be reappropriated. most of his career to make significant progress on any of these questions. This failure can be linked, I believe, to his insufficient regard for the complexity of social life. In addressing the issues of institutional interrelation and the relation of institutions and personality, Habermas has simply lacked the theoretical vocabulary to distinguish the complex causal processes involved. On the issue of moral and symbolic development, moreover, he has had no substantive theory at all. Only in his most recent work has Habermas (1975) begun to surmount these difficulties. It is far from accidental that he has done so only by drawing extensively on Parsons's own theoretical system.
